I. Introduction: Two Puzzles
The central premise of the Received Theory is that trade agreements arise solely because countries with market power are concerned, to at least some degree, with the fact that trade barriers, imposed for whatever reason, can move the terms of trade in their favor, shifting real income there from the rest of the world.
As pointed out in Ethier (2004) , the Received Theory is inconsistent with actual multilateral trade agreements, which do not prevent countries from trying to influence their terms of trade. I refer to this discrepancy as the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle.
Nothing in the GATT prevents a country from implementing export taxes. In their schedules of negotiated concessions, countries have bound their import taxes: They have not,
with very rare exception, bound export taxes. If the EU, for example, were to decide, for whatever reason, to impose aggressively a set of export taxes that could improve its terms of trade, its outstanding multilateral trade obligations would not prevent it from doing so.
The more sophisticated and realistic contributions to the Received Theory -notably Staiger (1999, 2002 ) -do not assume that governments care only about aggregate social welfare, but allow them to be concerned with any number of internal or political-economy objectives that relate to the domestic relative price of imports in terms of exports. This price can be manipulated unilaterally with trade policy, but, if a country has market power, such manipulation will impact the terms of trade, creating an international externality that shifts part of the cost of the policy onto the rest of the world. Dealing with this terms-of-trade externality is the sole reason for trade agreements in these models.
Large countries will negotiate only trade agreements that constrain terms-of-trade manipulation. Trade agreements that do not do this would, for no reason, surrender the use of trade policy for domestic objectives. In reality we observe exactly the opposite. Countries negotiate trade agreements that do not prevent terms-of-trade manipulation, and do not negotiate multilateral agreements that would prevent it.
A fascinating feature of the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle is that it has been ignored in the international-trade-theory literature. For over four decades, successive GATT rounds have produced trade agreements that do not prevent terms-of-trade manipulation while trade theorists have produced theories of trade agreements in which such prevention is the sole object. More often than not, these theories have been based on two-good models in which an import tariff is completely equivalent to an export tax. Thus the GATT has been analyzed in a context in which the actual GATT would be completely meaningless! As far as I can tell, over these four decades no one has ever noted or addressed this problem.
A second puzzle was emphasized by Rodrik in his survey (1995, p1476-7) : "why is trade policy systematically used to transfer resources to import-competing sectors and factors rather than to export-oriented sectors and factors?" He concludes, " [o] n this puzzle we get very little help from the literature." Indeed, Levy (1999, p 346-7) argues "that in a symmetric version of the Helpman" (1994, 2002) "model, export subsidies exceed import tariffs in sectors with lobbies. ... Thus, this approach to modeling political economy may explain trade promotion rather than trade protection!" I refer to this as the Anti-Trade-Bias
Puzzle.
In sharp contrast to the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle, the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle has been widely recognized. But it has not been successfully addressed. Papers dealing with the political economy of trade policy typically either ignore this problem or eliminate it by arbitrarily constraining the ability of the government to adopt export-promotion policies.
One approach is simply to assume, in a political-economy model, that import-competing sectors organize politically while export sectors do not. This is convenient but arbitrary.
Another approach is to rule out export subsidies by pointing to countervailing-duty laws, whose existence are not explained. Indeed, I confess to having done this myself (in Ethier (2004) ). This accords well with reality but suffers from the fact that the countervailing-duty laws are themselves essential components of the commercial policy that is to be explained.
These two puzzles are not just puzzling with respect to the trade-theory literature: They're puzzling in relation to each other as well. A natural response to the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle would be to deny the practical importance of the terms-of-trade externalities upon which the Received Theory has been erected. But the Received Theory can offer a ready explanation of the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle: terms-of-trade externalities! Ethier (2004) argued that a theory of trade agreements based on political externalities could resolve the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle. That paper assumed away terms-of-trade externalities, and its analysis of political externalities was not based on an explicit microeconomic model. Here I confront the puzzles directly by going beyond that preliminary effort in four ways. First, I develop such a microeconomic model. Second, I complement the earlier paper by introducing a type of political externality different from that employed there. Third, I
allow an interaction between political and terms-of-trade externalities. Fourth, I explicitly allow export subsidies in order to address the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle.
This paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes an economic model, and the following section adds a model of lobbying. The latter is a version of the familiar model of Helpman (1994, 2002) 
II. The Model: Economics
Assume two countries (Home and Foreign), two factors (Kapital and Labor), and three traded goods (0, 1, and 2). Good 0 is a numeráire good, produced by labor alone. Goods 1 and 2 are produced by capital and labor, with capital specific to each of these sectors. H imports good 1 and exports good 2.
i Ownership of each specific factor is distributed uniformly over a fraction " of the population (labor force), with each individual owning some of one of the specific factors.
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Normalize so that L = 1 = " + " . Choose units so that a unit of good 0 is produced by a unit of labor. Thus, assuming good 0 is actually produced, the wage w = 1.
Each individual in each country has preferences that can be summarized by the utility i function where c denotes consumption of good i. This implies The population consists of two groups, distinguished by which specific factor they own.
The real income of each group is given by the following. Helpman (1994, 2002) .
Lobbies

12
I assume that " and " each organizes a lobby to bargain with the government over trade policy and lobby contributions. By contrast, Grossman and Helpman (1994) allow some sectors to be organized and some not. Since I wish to address the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle, it
would not do to pre-determine the outcome by assuming that one sector organizes and one does not.
As Austen-Smith (1991, p 84) Grossman and Helpman (1995, footnote 11) point out, the efforts of the two groups exactly cancel in this regard. Allowing each group a comparative advantage in lobbying over the instrument directly pertaining to its sector offers an escape from this conundrum. For then I can allow both sectors to organize while still giving a political dimension to policy choice, because their efforts will not cancel out.
The assumptions that there are but two non-numeráire goods and that all sectors organize are only for expositional clarity or, as just argued, to suit my purposes. Relaxing them would only complicate the algebra in ways already familiar from Grossman and Helpman. Although the assumption that each lobby addresses only one policy is more extreme than necessary, the idea that different lobbies have different comparative advantages in addressing different policies is, as I have pointed out, realistic.
(A1) also contrasts with Ethier (2004) . That paper justifies political externalities on the basis of imperfect information, but there the imperfection is a limited ability to observe the link between economic outcomes and policy choices. Here the justification is based on
asymmetric information endowing distinct lobbies with distinct abilities to lobby about different policies.
Trade policies and international externalities
11 1 The " lobby bargains with the government about t and the contribution C which that lobby will make. Unlike Grossman and Helpman (1994) , I assume the government's objective function gives no direct weight to national welfare. This will sharpen my results without altering them in any essential way.
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W denotes the joint surplus of the government and the " lobby, as they regard it, 1 associated with t .
Here D denotes the relative importance the agents attach to tariff revenue. If D = 1, and this conventional case will be the point of reference in what follows. But I want also to allow consideration of the possibility that D < 1, in recognition of the fact that public debate in industrial countries about trade policy almost never concerns itself with the consequences of such policies for government revenue.
1 From (3), a change in t produces the following effect on the joint surplus.
In the conventional case D = 1 this reduces to the following.
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The Home terms of trade is given by the index P /P , with either the numerator or the denominator (but not both) 2 augmented by unity weighted to reflect the relative volume of trade in the numeráire good.
The two bracketed terms within the braces on the right-hand side of each expression respectively reflect what Grossman and Helpman (1995, p 688) The political-support effect on the right-hand side of (4) involves a balance of the effect on specific-factor income, which calls for more protection, and the effect on consumer surplus, which calls for less. Since the case where the former influence dominates is likely to be the situation of practical relevance, I shall occasionally impose the following assumption.
Note also the role that D plays with regard to the terms-of-trade motive in (4).
Remark 3 A terms-of-trade motive can be present only to the degree that agents are
motivated by a concern for trade-tax revenue.
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A change in t also has an impact on the analogous foreign joint surplus, W *,
The two bracketed terms within the braces on the right-hand side respectively reflect the international terms-of-trade and political-support externalities of trade policy. Staiger (1999) . In this case " * = 1, so that the political externality would drop out and only the terms-of-trade externality would remain. The assumption that the terms-of-trade externality is the only international externality is the point of departure of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) .
Remark 4 An increase in the
Policy choice
Following Goldberg and Maggi (1999) , I assume the bargaining solution maximizes the joint 1 surplus W of both parties. In doing so I am in effect assuming that the asymmetric information, which presumably causes the asymmetric influence of the respective lobbies, does not result in strategic behavior that precludes an efficient bargaining solution. The first-order 3 condition for this implies the following Home tariff on good 1.
(A3) which reduces to the following when D = 1:
Note that, for the importable sector, the terms-of-trade and political-support motives reinforce each other in the protectionist direction. 
IV. Terms-of-trade dominance
Suppose, first, that both inequalities in (A3) are reversed. In this case, terms-of-trade motives outweigh political-support motives, and an export tax is called for in each country, though it will be less than if political-support motives were absent.
If Foreign trade policy is derived analogously, the following Nash equilibrium in trade policy emerges when D = 1.
The formulae for export taxes yield positive values because of second-order conditions:
Neither country would wish to operate on an inelastic portion of its partner's import-demand curve. I have the following.
Proposition 2 If (A1) holds and both parts of (A3) are violated (i.e., terms-of-trade motives outweigh political-support motives) and trade taxes are fully valued (D = 1), the Nash equilibrium in trade policy is given by (8). It features both import taxes and export taxes by both countries.
To put this result in perspective relevant to the literature, note the following. Grossman and Helpman (1994) , the government gave some weight to national welfare, it would take such cross effects into account. This would alter (8) to cause it more nearly to resemble (3). But, as long as the organized sectors cannot lobby over all policies and the government gives at least some weight to contributions, a distinction will remain.
Ignoring a possible government concern with national welfare simply sharpens that distinction.
Remark 7 Bagwell and Staiger (1999) 
V. Political-Support Dominance
Next, suppose that (A2) and (A3) hold, so that political-support motives dominate terms-of-4 trade motives. In his case the Nash equilibrium in trade policy is as follows.
Proposition 3 With (A1), (A2), and (A3), the Nash equilibrium in trade policy is given by (9). Neither country taxes exports. This is due to (A1) and to the assumption, in (A3), that political-support motives outweigh terms-of-trade motives.
Remark 9 Proposition 3 offers a potential resolution of the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle.
When political-support motives dominate, governments have no desire to tax exports. Thus trade agreements need not constrain them from doing so.
VI. Properties of Equilibrium When Political-support Motives Dominate
Consider an initial situation in which each country neither taxes nor subsidizes exports and sets the import tariff that constitutes its best response to its partner's zero export tax. This situation is not a Nash equilibrium, since, by (A3), (7) implies that either country can gain by 1 an export subsidy. In Figure 1 below, J denotes H's best response to J * = 1, and B denotes 1 F's best response to J = 1. B corresponds to an export subsidy by F, reflecting the assumption (A3) that political-support motives dominate terms-of-trade motives.
Best responses 11 1
The N locus depicts all those combinations of J and J * implying the same value of Q as at M dt * and R* will fall by Q * M dt *. Thus the real income of both interest groups in H rises, and the reverse in F. This countervailing increase in its tariff constitutes a beneficial H response to F's adoption of an export subsidy.
In like manner, N depicts the iso-domestic-price locus corresponding to free trade F and N* that corresponding to B. Since these three loci (all rectangular hyperbolae) correspond to different values of the domestic prices, they cannot intersect.
Moving northwest along any one of these loci leaves all demands and supplies unchanged:
The only effect is to shift trade-tax revenue from F to H.
At a point on N such as G in Figure 1 , H completely countervails an export subsidy by F.
But could H do even better with a different response? Since J is an H best response, a small 11 1 reduction in J from J will produce a zero first-order effect on W . A small reduction in J from G would produce exactly the same result as a similar reduction from J, with just one 11 1 exception. Since J is larger at G than at J, the increase in M produced by the fall in J 1 would produce a greater increase in tariff revenue. Thus W would increase, so that the H best-response curve (BR) must pass below N.
Figure 1 Political-Support Dominance
To verify this intuition, note that (4) can be written as follows.
Since point J denotes an H best response, Also,
Thus, along the N locus, MW /Mt < 0 if t > t , so that H's best response lies below that J locus.
Proposition 4 H's best response to an export subsidy by F is to countervail the subsidy incompletely.
If H were to adopt a policy of completely countervailing an export subsidy, F would not offer to pay one. H is willing to countervail only partially, thereby allowing F to stimulate exports, to capture for itself a portion of the subsidy by taxing imports.
Remark 10 To stimulate exports, F must subsidize H as well as subsidizing its own exporters.
Note that, from (10), H's temptation to countervail incompletely is positively related to D and, therefore, to the strength of the terms-of-trade motive, even though the opportunity to countervail, incompletely or not, would not arise if terms-of-trade motives dominated political-support motives.
Remark 11 An increase in the importance attached to trade-tax revenue, and, therefore, to the terms-of-trade motive, increases the motive to countervail only partially.
(10)
Since B is an F best response, a small reduction in the export subsidy (i.e., a rise in J *) 11 from B will produce a zero first-order effect on W *. A small rise in J * from any point northwest of B on N* will produce exactly the same result as a similar rise from B, except 11 that the fall in X * produced by the rise in J * will produce a greater reduction in the total 1 export subsidy. Thus W * increases and the F best-response curve (BR*) must pass above N*.
Formally, note that
At point B, since B is a F best response. Thus, at any other point on 11 N *, where t * < t * < 0, So BR* lies to the right of N*.
B
Remark 12 An increase in the importance attached to trade-tax revenue, and, therefore, to the terms-of-trade motive, increases the motive to nullify only partially an import duty
with an export subsidy.
Equilibrium: the third puzzle
The above detail about best responses now permits a closer look at the politically-dominant Nash equilibrium (9). Allow each country to choose whether to adopt (A = Y) or not to adopt (A = N) a countervailing duty law. Adoption of such a law will constitute a commitment by that country to countervail exactly any export subsidy by its trading partner with a tariff of its own. Each country's strategy now consists of a policy triple: the two trade taxes or subsidies and setting A equal to Y or N. In each country, the government bargains with the importcompeting lobby over the tariff and A, and it bargains independently with the export lobby over the export tax or subsidy.
If terms-of-trade motives outweigh political-support motives, the choice of A is of no significance because neither country wishes to subsidize exports: Equilibrium is described by (8) in either event. When political-support motives dominate, however, the choice of A is potentially significant.
As mentioned above, papers on trade policy sometimes have assumed away export subsidies and justified this by appealing to the existence of countervailing-duty laws. I now enquire whether this latter fact is consistent with the present model by allowing the choice of A to be endogenous. shown by E in Figure 1 . This corresponds to (9). If H decides A = N (i.e., does not implement a countervailing-duty law), E will be the equilibrium. Were H instead to set A = Y, F would be constrained to operate on N and would therefore choose J. From H's point of view, E is better than the point on N directly above it, and that point is in turn better than J. So H chooses A = N and the policy pair is given by E.
Proposition 5 With (A1), (A2), and (A3), the Nash equilibrium in trade policy is given by (9). Neither country implements a countervailing duty law, both subsidize exports, and each appropriates part, but not all, of its partner's export subsidy with a tariff.
What's going on is the following. The fact that an import tax-cum-foreign export subsidy produces an international transfer in effect implies that to stimulate exports F must subsidize not just its own exporters but the H government as well, to induce it to less-than-completelycountervail in equilibrium. If political-support motives are strong relative to terms-of-trade motives (which work through trade-tax revenue), H will demand a high subsidy and F will be willing to pay it. The Nash equilibrium will be characterized by large tariffs, large export subsidies, and consequently large transfers, but not necessarily by large effects on actual trade flows. With the opposite going on in the other sector, the net international transfer need not be significant, but each trade flow itself accomplishes a large transfer.
It has long been clear that an export subsidy together with an appropriate tariff by the trading partner can effect an international transfer that does not influence relative prices.
This is convenient theoretically in enabling countries to achieve, using only trade policies, a cooperative trade agreement that requires an international transfer for both countries to
Whether this has ever been relevant in reality is something else. benefit. See Dixit (1987) and Grossman and Helpman (2002) . My assertion here is that, 5 when political-support motives dominate, such an argument is also crucial for the nature of a non-cooperative equilibrium.
Remark 13 When political-support motives dominate terms-of-trade motives, the model generates the counterfactual predictions of no countervailing-duty laws, extensive export subsidization, and significant international transfers.
I refer to this counterfactual implication of the model as the Export-Subsidy-Transfer Puzzle.
Note that, as implied by Remarks 11 and 12, a reduction in D (from unity perhaps) reduces the incentive for H and F, respectively, to depart from N and from N*. This implies a presumption that the respective best-response curves hug N and N* more closely, shifting the equilibrium E in Figure 1 to the northwest. This would increase the tariff, the subsidy, and the transfer, with an ambiguous effect on actual trade.
Remark 14 The model implies a presumption that a reduction in the significance D that agents attach to trade-tax revenue (and, therefore, in the relative importance of terms-oftrade motives) will accentuate the Export-Subsidy-Transfer Puzzle.
Turn implicit at point C is the minimum transfer the H government-cum-import competing lobby must be paid to induce it to accept the free-trade outcome, and the transfer implicit at point D is the largest the F government-cum-lobby is willing to pay for that outcome.
Proposition 6 If (A1), (A2), and (A3) hold, the equilibrium in trade policy will have an anti-trade or a pro-trade bias according as H would require a greater or a lesser transfer to accept the free-trade outcome than F would be willing to pay.
There appears to be no reason why one or the other circumstance should hold, so the AntiTrade-Bias Puzzle is apparently not resolved.
Remark 15 If political-support motives dominate terms-of-trade motives, the Terms-ofTrade Puzzle is resolved, the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle is not resolved, and the Export-
Subsidy-Transfer Puzzle is introduced.
If terms-of-trade motives dominate, the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle is resolved and the ExportSubsidy-Transfer Puzzle does not appear, but the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle reappears. In either case, the Grossman-Helpman model in this three-good simplification delivers results dramatically at odds with reality. This simplification puts the counterfactual implications of the Grossman-Helpman approach into sharp relief: It does not generate them.
VII. Complete Political-Support Dominance
I now take the analysis of the preceding section to its logical extreme by considering the possibility that H and F care nothing about trade-tax revenue. I call this case Complete Political-Support Dominance, since it implies no weight at all is given to terms-of-trade motives. To allow determinate outcomes, suppose that agents value trade taxes in a lexicographic sense: I'll pay anything for something, but I'll pay no more than nothing for nothing.
Then, given (A2) and (A4), (4) implies that so that H will wish a positive 11 1 tariff on good 1. Furthermore, an increase in t will raise x /M , so that it remains true that 1 H will wish to set t at the prohibitive level. Also, (A4) implies that H will be unwilling to surrender any of its market to F to obtain trade-tax revenue. So, if point J in Figure 1 corresponds to H's prohibitive tariff, its best-response curve will coincide with N.
From (11), (A4) implies that F will wish to subsidize exports. In particular, this is true at 11 any point on H's best-response curve: There is no Nash equilibrium in t and t * alone! With (A4) holding, viewing policy choice as a triple now becomes crucial for an equilib- 
1 N. Then the best F can do is to set t * = 0 and thereby choose J. I now have the following equilibrium in policy.
Proposition 7 With (A1), (A2), (A3), and (A4), the equilibrium in trade policy is given by (12). It features countervailing-duty laws, neither export taxes nor export subsidies, and
prohibitive tariffs.
Remark 16 Countervailing-duty laws emerge here as the result of non-cooperative choices by the two governments, not as a result of a trade agreement.
In reality it is true that the GATT, in Article XVI, attempts to curtail the use of export subsidies and also provides a code of conduct regarding countervailing-duty laws for WTO members. But such laws were in existence long before the GATT.
Remark 17 Proposition 7 offers a resolution of the Export-Subsidy-Transfer Puzzle.
The suggestion is that, in each country by itself, the government and the export lobby can indeed increase their joint surplus by encouraging exports (given (A3)), but actually doing so is not consistent with equilibrium in a two-country, non-cooperative, policy-setting context, given (A4).
Remark 18 Proposition 7 offers a resolution of the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle.
This follows from the endogenous introduction of countervailing-duty laws. Another implication of this endogenous introduction is the following.
Remark 19 If political-support motives dominate terms-of-trade motives (A3) and no agent addresses trade-tax revenue (A4), each government is powerless to offer its export lobby anything in Nash equilibrium.
This will turn out to be the essential reason for negotiations to reach trade agreements of the sort actually observed. It's crucial to realize that this environment is not assumed: It's a direct consequence of the requirements for equilibrium when political-support effects completely outweigh terms-of-trade effects.
So, finally, the model offers a resolution of all the embarrassing puzzles. But to do so it imposes D = 0 and implies prohibitive tariffs. It's time to take stock. I offer two comments.
First, D = 0 and prohibitive tariffs may or may not be to the reader's taste. It may or may not offer a reasonable explanation for, say, the Smoot-Hawley tariff. It is, though, linked to a key feature of the Grossman-Helpman approach to trade policy. With (A4), deciding whether to extend protection to a sector amounts to weighing the positive effect on the sector's specific-factor income against the negative effect on consumer surplus. With (A3), the former effect dominates, and this dominance increases as protection raises supply in the sector and reduces demand. A desire for trade-tax revenue (i.e. the negation of (A4)) is the sole potential motive for agents to impose less than prohibitive protection. This logic does not depend upon either of my simplifications that there are but two lobbies and that each lobbies only about the policy instrument directly affecting its own sector. Adding unorganized sectors would allow trade in those sectors, but would not affect the above logic with regard to organized sectors. Use of the Grossman-Helpman approach requires one to accept either the radical surgery of (A4) or a model clearly at odds with reality in the sense that it must display some combination of the three puzzles.
Second, imposing (A4) can not be regarded as a simple approximation to the idea that trade-tax revenue is less important to agents than other income (D < 1). Giving trade-tax revenue a reduced role in the objective functions just makes things worse by shifting E in Figure 1 further to the northwest. Such revenue must receive no weight at all to imply outcomes consistent with reality. The outcome implied by (A4) is a singularity, not the limiting case as D goes to zero.
Remark 20
The current approach to modeling trade policy formation requires either the toleration of some combination of the three puzzles or the imposition of (A4).
VIII. Trade Agreements
Now suppose that the H and F governments can undertake negotiations for a trade agreement that would stipulate the trade taxes or subsidies. In the event of such negotiations, each interest group would lobby its government about the taxes in the agreement that pertain directly to it. I inquire whether there is a basis for such negotiations, what such a basis might be, and how it relates to the various alternative cases described above.
The exchange of market access
A large literature insists that trade agreements seek to exchange market access: I'll grant your exporters increased access to my market in exchange for increased access to your market for my exporters. For an institutional approach, see Hauser (1986 ), Finger (1988 , 1991 , and Moser (1990) ; for a more formal approach, see, Hillman, Long, and Moser (1995) , and Hillman and Moser (1996) 
Terms-of-trade dominance
Here the Nash equilibrium in trade policy is given by (8), which is, in effect, two independ-1 ent Nash equilibria in the two sectors. For the usual reasons, a cooperative equilibrium in t 1 and t * can improve over the non-cooperative one, and likewise for sector 2; in each sector, an appropriate reduction in one country's import tariff and the other country's export tax will be mutually beneficial. I spare the reader the familiar details. That is, such negotiations are not based on the exchange of market access, by the above definition, and they produce trade agreements that are subject to the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle.
As this seems less than satisfactory, I proceed to the next case.
Political-support dominance
In this case the Nash equilibrium in trade policy is given by (9), which is, again, two independent Nash equilibria in the two sectors. Again for the usual reasons, a cooperative 11 equilibrium in t and t * can improve over the non-cooperative one, and likewise for sector 2;
in each sector, an appropriate reduction in one country's import tariff and the other country's export subsidy will be mutually beneficial. I again spare the reader the familiar details. As this again seems to correspond uncomfortably with reality, I now proceed to the final case.
Complete political-support dominance
The equilibrium described in (12) offers no opportunity for an intra-sectoral trade agreement, in sharp contrast to the two preceding cases. In sector 1, for example, H has a prohibitive 1 tariff in place. Retreating from this would impose a first-order cost on W , since the gain in consumer surplus would be strictly less than the reduction in specific-factor income. If 1 constrained to use t *, F can offer nothing in return: With D = 0, H would not value a transfer in trade-tax revenue produced by a countervailed F export subsidy. Thus any trade agreement must be based on the exchange of market access.
The motive for a trade agreement based on the exchange of market access would be to enable each government to offer its export sector something while taking something less from its import-competing sector. It is true that, with the equilibrium (12), each government is powerless to offer its export sector something in any other way. (12), where x = d and x * = d *, will produce the following.
12 1
Now consider a hypothetical trade agreement stipulating dt < 0 and dt * = " dt for some parameter ". Such an agreement will raise the joint surplus in each country, and so be perceived as beneficial by each government, if and only if the following holds. This will in turn be possible for some choice of " > 0 if and only if the following condition is met.
The attentive reader will recognize this logic as that behind the familiar Hawkins-Simon (1949) and J determined by The situation for good 2 is analogous.
Utilizing this information along with (13) allows (14) to be rewritten as follows.
Figure 2 Mutually Beneficial Exchange of Market Access
So we have the following result.
Proposition 10 With (A1) -(A5) a mutually-beneficial trade agreement is feasible. This agreement is based on the exchange of market access, and it need not constrain export taxes.
So, given the complete dominance of political-support motives, the model can deliver trade agreements resembling those that actually exist.
IX. Concluding Remarks
The Received Theory of international trade agreements, the result of half a century of research by international trade theorists, suffers from fundamental puzzles that call into question its very relevance to reality. The Terms-of-Trade Puzzle: The Received Theory assumes that the sole purpose of trade agreements is to address terms-of-trade externalities, but actual GATT multilateral trade agreements just do not do this. The Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle: Actual trade policies have always tried to restrict trade much more often than they have tried to stimulate it, but the models used by the Received Theory do not imply this result, unless doctored up to produce it.
To address these problems I have explored a model, based on Grossman and Helpman (2002) , simplified for transparency by assuming just three goods and by allowing each 7 lobby a (realistic) comparative advantage in lobbying over the policy instrument of direct relevance to it. This produced the following argument.
At the equilibrium given by (12),
• An exercise of trade policy produces both a terms-of-trade effect and a political-support effect for the government implementing the policy, plus both a terms-of-trade externality and a political-support externality on the foreign government.
• If terms-of-trade motives dominate, each government will (counter-factually) employ both import tariffs and export taxes in Nash equilibrium. Any trade agreement would presumably wish to address export taxes (the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle).
• If political-support effects dominate, in equilibrium each government will tax imports but not tax exports (the Terms-of-Trade Puzzle resolved). But the policies might on balance either restrict or stimulate trade (the Anti-Trade-Bias Puzzle not resolved), and (counter factually), neither country will implement a countervailing-duty law, and each will attempt, by implement an export subsidy, that is only partly countervailed by its partner, to "bribe" the other government into allowing more imports than it otherwise would (the Export-Subsidy-Transfer Puzzle is introduced).
• If political-support effects completely dominate, each government taxes imports, implements a countervailing-duty law, and neither taxes nor subsidizes exports (thereby offering a resolution of all three puzzles. But the assumption of complete political-support dominance is strong and leaves each government with no reason to refrain from pushing protection to prohibitive levels in the absence of a trade agreement.
• If terms-of-trade motives dominate, the governments have an incentive to conclude sector-by-sector trade agreements. Such agreements would not be motivated by the exchange of market access and would require export taxes to be constrained.
• If political-support motives dominate, the governments have an incentive to conclude sector-by-sector trade agreements. Such agreements would not be motivated by the exchange of market access, and would require export subsidies to be constrained but would not attempt to eliminate them altogether.
• If political-support effects completely dominate, neither government can unilaterally deliver anything to its export lobby, nor can sector-by-sector negotiations achieve anything. The two governments have an incentive to negotiate a trade agreement to exchange market access, and such an agreement would resolve all three puzzles.
So, this paper offers a potential resolution of the three puzzles. But a special circumstance is required: complete political-support dominance.
I draw two bottom-line implications from this exploration. i The presumed dominance of terms-of-trade externalities, central to the Received Theory for half a century, must be junked. ii The following question must be faced:
Should the assumption of complete political-support dominance (A4) be embraced, or should the Grossman-Helpman approach to trade policy be junked?
The answer, tender reader, I leave you to decide for yourself.
